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The most logical solution seems to rest in a balance of policies. The
power to depart from the letter, in supposed adherence to the spirit, should
not be exercised unless the policy of the law is saved. Burns v. McCormick,
ante. However, let there once be established a contract (by reliable, disinter-
ested witnesses, by an authentic memorandum which shows the intent of the
parties, or by other proof which admits of no doubt) which contravenes no
sound public policy, which is not unconscionable, which appeals to the con-
science of the court and accords with natural justice, the proposition that the
performance must be "unequivocally referable to the agreement" becomes of
no moment-except as it may have had a bearing on the establishment of the
contract. Salem v. Finne', 127 Misc. 387, Z15 N.Y Supp. 553 (1926).
Such a view would be feasible because it has been held in Ohio that it is not
error to admit parol evidence of the terms of the contract before proof of its
part performance has been given. Shahan v. Swan, ante. We do not have in
mind a result such as that reached in Gramann v. Borgmann, 14 N.P (N.S.)
449, 31 O.D. 668 (1913), where it was decided that the oral land contract
was established by dear and convincing evidence where two interested wit-
nesses testified to events occurring 41 years before. However, if this approach
to the problem were adopted with due caution and regard to a balance of the
fundamental policies involved, the full intent and purpose of the statute
could be better realized.
EDWIN R. TEPLE.
RIGHT OF A BANKRUPT TO SUE ON A CLAIM
WHICH AROSE BEFORE BANKRUPTCY
WHICH WAS NOT PROSECUTED
BY THE TRUSTEE
This question was incidentally raised in Ohio in the case of Whitehead,
Adm'r v. Parsons, 6 Ohio Abs. 274, Lucas County Ct. of Appeals, Jan. z,
1934. Parson conveyed land to Pickard, who was to make part payment in
cash and give a purchase money mortgage for the balance. Pickard never paid
the full amount of the cash payment. Later, Parsons was declared a bankrupt,
the estate administered and closed, and the bankrupt discharged. The trans-
action between Parsons and Pickard was included in the schedule, but its true
nature was not disclosed. This action was brought to recover the unpaid
balance of the cash payment from Whitehead, who was Pickard's administrator.
The court did not decide the question in which we are interested, but,
in a dictum, it said, "She (Parsons) could not, after being adjudicated a
bankrupt and having received her discharge, ordinarily bring suit upon any
right of action that was vested in her at the time she filed her petition in
bankruptcy"
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the property and powers of the
bankrupt, as set out in Sec. 70a (i I U.S.C.A. I IOa), and the "rights, rem-
edies and powers" of creditors, as mentioned in Sec. 47a-2 (IxI U.S.C.A. 75
a-a), are vested in the trustee "by operation of law." In particular, Sec. 7oa
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provides that title to: "(I) documents relating to property; (z) interests in
patent rights , (3) powers which he (the bankrupt) could have exer-
cised for his own benefit , (6) rights of action arising upon contracts
or for unlawful taking or detention of or injury to, his property" shall be
vested in the trustee. The provision for vesting title in the trustee was prac-
tically the same in the Bankruptcy Act of 1867. This is mentioned, because
some of the cases considered were decided under the former act.
The only provision of the Bankruptcy Act which mentions the revesting
of title in the bankrupt is Sec. 7of. ii U.S.C.A. i iof. This provides that
upon confirmation of a composition agreement, title to all his property shall
revest in the bankrupt.
If this provision were as far as the law went, there would be, in the
absence of a composition agreement, no possibility for a bankrupt to sue on a
claim which arose before bankruptcy and which was of the type which would
pass to the trustee. However, the courts have developed the doctrine of
abandonment, which allows the revesting of title to property in the bankrupt.
This doctrine has grown up to provide for the disposition of burdensome real
property and leases. It states that a trustee in bankruptcy is not bound to
accept real property when it will be a charge on the estate. If the trustee
does not take possession of the property within a reasonable time, it will be
assumed that he elected not to accept the property, and title will revest in
the bankrupt. Sparhawkes v. Yerkes; 142 U.S. I, 35 L. ed. 915, 13 S.Ct.
104 (189i), Dushane v Beall, i6I U.s. 513, 40 L. ed. 791, 16 S. Ct. 637
(1896), Collier on Bankruptcy (1 3d) p. 1738-39; Remingtoz on Bank-
ruptcy ( 3d) Sec. 1154-6o.
The courts have applied this doctrine to choses in action. The bankrupt
cannot, however, sustain a claim that title to a chose in action has revested in
him unless he shows (i) that the trustee had notice of the chose in action,
and (2) that he elected not to prosecute it. Buckingham v. Buckingham,
36 O.S. 68, III Longsdorf's Notes 830 (i88o). There can be no election to
abandon where the chose in action is concealed from the trustee, First Nat.
Bank v Lasater, i96 U.S. 105, 25 S. Ct. 2o6, 49 L. ed. 408 (i9o), and
thus in case of failure to give actual notice or notice by schedule (inferen-
tially concealing asset) there can be no abandonment. Perkins v. Alexander,
209 S.W 789, 46 Am. Bb. R. 44 (Texas, i919). In the absence of all
evidence concerning the bankruptcy proceedings, it has been presumed that a
trustee was appointed, and that he did not elect to abandon the claim. Hutch-
inson v. Dobbins, 30 Ga. App. 211, iz S.E. 905, 4 Am. B. R (ns) 315.
In cases involving personal property other than choses in action, the same
principles apply, and if an election to abandon is shown, title to the property
revests in the bankrupt. Sessions v. Romodka, 145 U.S. 29, 12 S. Ct. 799,
36 L. ed. 609 (1897). Where the trustee has elected to abandon property,
and the abandonment has been approved by the court, the court has no right
to withhold the property from the bankrupt. In re Wattley, In re Crane, 62
Fed. (7d) 829 (935), Meyers v. Josephson, 124 Fed. 734 (1903). Fail-
ure to administer funds received from a railroad pension, after notice, will bar
the trustee's right to such funds. Gilbert v. Norfolk Ry. Co., 171 S.E. 814,
(W Va. 1933).
There is no problem of abandonment if no trustee is appointed, for title
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would not be divested from the bankrupt. He could later maintain action in
his own name even though the cause arose before bankruptcy. Rand v. Iowa
Cent. Ry. Co., 186 N.Y 58, 78 N.E. 574 (i9o6).
Where the bankrupt sues before the closing of the estate on a pre-
bankruptcy claim, the tests for abandonment and the application of the doc-
trine have been practically the same. The trustee cannot be said to have
abandoned a claim if he prosecutes it as soon as he finds out about it. Ham-
mond v. TVhittredge, 204 U.S. 538, 29 S. Ct. 396, 51 L. ed. 6o6 (1907).
And, non-action by the trustee as long as a claim is uncollectible will not
constitute such abandonment as will revest title in the bankrupt. In re Wise-
man and Vallace, 159 Fed. 236 (i9o8). Under the Act of x867, it was
possible for action by the trustee to be barred before the closing of the estate.
U.S. Rev. Stat. (2d) Sec. 5057. It was held that if the abandonment came
after the action by the trustee was barred, action by the bankrupt would also
be barred. Kenyon v. Wfrisley, 147 Mass. 476, 18 N.E. 2Z7, i L.R.A. 348
(1888). No analagous situation could arise today, for the statute of limitations
in the present Bankruptcy Act provides that "suits shall not be brought by or
against a trustee subsequent to two years after the estate has been closed."
i I U.S.C.A. 29 d, Bankruptcy Act I id.
New Hampshire courts have allowed bankrupts to prosecute actions before
the estate was closed if an abandonment was shown. Non-action by the trustee
after having notice of the claims constituted abandonment. Towle v. Rowe,
58 N.H. 394, Ramsey v. Fellows, 58 N.H. 707 (1789) (both under the
Act of 1867), Hubbard v. Gould, 74 N.H. 25, 74 A. 6o8 (I9O6) (under
the Act of 1898). The results were the same in the cases of Morgan v.
Ownbey, z Harr. 437, 4 Am. B.R. (ns) 1173, 125 A. 418, Delaware,
1923) and Leach v. Bank of Vollmer, 47 Idaho 273, 274 Pac. 627, 14 Am.
B.R. (ns) 694 (1924).
In situations similar to that of the principal case, the bankrupt has been
allowed to prosecute an action after the closing of the estate and his own dis-
charge where an abandonment is clearly shown. If property is once aband-
oned, it cannot be later reclaimed by the trustee. Irwin v. Harris, 189 N.C.
465, 127 S.W 529 (1935), In re Wattley--supra. If the trustee fails to
accept "onerous or unprofitable assets or tights," they revert to the bankrupt
after the trustee's discharge, and he may maintain action on such right. Metz
v. Emery, IIo Kan. 405, 204 Pac. 734, 48 Am. B.R. 24 (i933). "Where
the trustee takes the affirmative action of getting the permission of the court
to abandon property, the result is the same, and the abandonment is easier to
prove. The bankrupt may sue after the closing of the estate and discharge.
In re W1ebb, Webb v. Raleigh Hdwr Co.-54 Fed. (2d) io65-1932.
Where neither an express or implied abandonment of an asset by the
trustee is shown, the bankrupt would probably not be allowed to assert title
to such asset. The Bankruptcy Act provides that where it is shown that
unadministered assets exist, the estate may be re-opened. I i U.S.C.A. I (8),
Bankruptcy Act 2 (8). A discharged trustee cannot re-open an estate, In re
Pane, 127 Fed 246, xx A.B.R. 351 (I9O4), but creditors, In re Levy 259
Fed. 314, 44. Am. B.R. 773 (i919) and the bankrupt himself, In re Sayer
7lO Fed. 397 (914) may re-open the estate on showing the existence of
unadministered assets. The petition to re-open the estate must be brought
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within a reasonable time, In re Pamne-supra, and an estate cannot be
re-opened to remove the bar of the statute of limitations provided in Sec. i Id
of the Bankruptcy Act. Kinder v. Scharf-?z31 U.S. 517, 58 L. ed. 343,
34 S. Ct. 164-19i 3 . Such a means for reaching unabandoned, unadmin-
istered property should, it is submitted, be exclusive.
If it were possible to show, in the principal case, that Parsons' trustee had
notice of the claim against Whitehead's decedent, the case might be taken out
of the category of cases in which the bankrupt may not "ordinarily bring suit"
on a pre-bankruptcy claim.
ROBERT B. GOSLINE.
INJURY SUFFERED AS A RESULT OF VIOLATION
OF HOURS OF LABOR STATUTE
The plaintiff in her petition alleged that she was sixteen years of age, as
the defendant knew, and that she was employed by the defendant i zy to
x3y2 hours per day, and 75 to 80 hours a week in violation of sections 11,996
of the Ohio General Code, which provided that no girl under eighteen
should be employed more than eight hours in any one day nor more than
forty-eight hours in any one week. Plaintiff further alleged that as a proxi-
mate result of defendant's violation of the statute, she became physically
exhausted, suffered nervous breakdown, was forced to seek medical attention,
was caused great embarrassment, and mental distress, and was damaged to the
extent of $ 5,ooo. The trial court sustained a demurrer to her petition,
which the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J.,
dissenting, held that the demurrer was properly sustained. Mabley & Carer
Co. v. Lee, a minor, 129 Ohio St. 69 (934).
The majority opinion recognized that plaintiff was attempting to main-
tain an action at common law, but held that the constitutional provision relat-
ing to Workmen's Compensation barred any such action. They did not
decide, nor was it necessary for them to do so, whether the plaintiff could
recover anything under that act.
Article II, section 35, of the Ohio Constitution provides that laws may
be passed for the purpose of providing compensation to workmen and their
defendents for death, injuries, or occupational disease, occasioned in the
course of employment and that such compensation shall be in lieu of all other
rights to compensation, or damages for such death, injuries, or occupational
disease.
It would seem that plaintiff could not have recovered in Workman's
Compensation for death, injury, or occupational disease. She is alive. She
has no occupational disease. Industrial Commission of Oio v. Roth, 98 Ohio
St. 34, 38, ilo N.E. 172, 173, 6 A.L.R. 1463, 1465, (1918, General Code
section i 4 6 5-68A. Now has she suffered an injury as the term has been
construed in the act? The court has repeatedly held that the injury must
be traumatic. Industrial Commisson of Ohi v. Armacost, 1z9 Ohio St. 176
(935), (there is no such evidence (of trauma) in the case now before us);
Industrial Commission of Ohi v. Middleto", 126 Ohio St. ziI, 184 N.E.
